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Abstract
We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between o¤ers and coun-
tero¤ers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s, we
provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s.
When players have di¤erent time preferences, reaching an immediate agreement may
not be Pareto e¢ cient. The recursive technique developed in this paper generalizes
that of Shaked and Sutton (1984) by incorporating the possibility of making unaccept-
able proposals into the backward induction analysis. Results from this paper extend
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ndings and resolve some open issues in the current literature.
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1 Introduction
Endogenous threats are an essential constituent of bargaining problems, as emphasized in
Nash (1953) at the dawn of modern bargaining theory. This paper develops a general ne-
gotiation model that incorporates endogenous threats into the alternating-o¤er bargaining
model of Rubinstein (1982). The early studies on this type of model, such as Fernandez
and Glazer (1991), Haller (1991), Haller and Holden (1990) and Bolt (1995), formally intro-
duce the unions decision to strike in contract negotiations. Busch and Wen (1995, 2001),
Houba (1997), and Slantchev (2003) allow for more general forms of endogenous threats,
modeled as a normal-form game, called the disagreement game, to be played between o¤ers
and countero¤ers.1 Despite of the fact that this class of games has complete information,
it generally admits multiple equilibria, including ine¢ cient ones with delayed agreements or
even no agreement at all. The set of the equilibrium payo¤s is fully characterized by the
so-called extreme equilibria that yield the lowest and highest equilibrium payo¤s to each
player. The backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) is commonly used
to derive these extreme equilibrium payo¤s in this class of models.
The model studied in this paper allows for a generic disagreement game in normal form
and a general set of possible agreements that might not even be convex. Despite of our
well-understanding of this model under common time preferences, we cannot directly adopt
the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) when players have di¤erent time preferences.
Characterizing extreme equilibrium payo¤s requires the Pareto frontier of equilibrium pay-
o¤s. Under common time preferences and a convex set of possible agreements, all possible
payo¤s are bounded by the bargaining frontier so that the Pareto frontier of equilibrium pay-
o¤s must be a subset of the given bargaining frontier. In other words, any Pareto e¢ cient
equilibrium must be achieved by immediate agreement. Consequently, making unacceptable
proposals would not be e¤ective in obtaining extreme equilibria.
When players have di¤erent time preferences, however, it is possible to have equilibrium
1See also surveys by Muthoo (1999) and Houba and Bolt (2002).
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payo¤s above the bargaining frontier even when all disagreement payo¤s are bounded by
the bargaining frontier. Players may receive payo¤s above the bargaining frontier through
intertemporal trade when they have di¤erent time preferences. It has been realized in other
dynamic problems that Pareto improvement is possible through intertemporal trade among
agents with di¤erent time preferences, see e.g., Ramsey (1928), Bewley (1972) and, more
recently, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999). In repeated games, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) demon-
strate that many equilibrium payo¤s are outside the conventionally dened set of feasible
payo¤s. The same phenomenon happens in the negotiation model when players have di¤er-
ent time preferences. As a result, the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s is no longer a
subset of the bargaining frontier. Therefore, we must incorporate the possibility of making
unacceptable proposals in the analysis of the extreme equilibria.2
Unlike in a repeated game where the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s is determined
by the given stage game, such a frontier in a negotiation game depends on the extreme
equilibrium payo¤s, which in turn depend on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s. Due
to this interdependency of extreme equilibrium payo¤s and the Pareto frontier of equilibrium
payo¤s, it is not trivial to extend the technique of Shaked and Sutton (1984) in this general
setup. We show that the lowest equilibrium payo¤ to the proposing player is the most
crucial extreme equilibrium payo¤ since it determines not only the other extreme equilibrium
payo¤s but also the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payo¤s. The lowest equilibrium payo¤ to
the proposing player is characterized by the least xed point of a minimax problem when
players are su¢ ciently patient. Except for some special cases, an analytical solution to the
proposing players least equilibrium payo¤ is not available in general due to the complicated
nature of the problem.
Our analysis conrms Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) who show that including unacceptable
proposals into the analysis would not change the insights obtained by Rubinstein (1982).
Excluding the possibility of making unacceptable proposals may have serious consequences in
2Unacceptable proposals are also necessary in studying the stochastic bargaining model of Merlo and
Wilson (1995), which is di¤erent from the negotiation model studied in this paper.
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a negotiation model with a non-degenerate disagreement game. This issue rst surfaced when
Bolt (1995) demonstrated that the strategy prole supporting the rms worst equilibrium in
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) fails to be an equilibrium when the rm is less patient than the
union. Our analysis in this paper identies the root of this problem in general and resolves
some issues left open in the literature.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a general negotiation model
with a generic disagreement game and a generic set of possible agreements. The analysis is
partitioned into three subsections. In Section 3.1, we derive a set of necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for extreme equilibrium payo¤s. In order to solve the extreme equilibrium payo¤s,
we need to know the Pareto frontier of continuation payo¤s, which is studied in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3, we derive the worst equilibrium to the proposing player. All our results can
be related to the literature, as we discuss in Section 3.4. In Section 4 we apply our results
to the special case with a common interest disagreement game to illustrate our ndings and
resolve some open questions.
2 The Model
Two players, called 1 and 2, negotiate for an agreement in the presence of a disagreement
game. In any period before an agreement is reached, one player makes a proposal and the
other player decides whether to accept the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, then the
negotiations end with the accepted proposal as the agreement. Otherwise, the players play
the disagreement game once before the negotiations proceed to the following period.
More specically, there are innitely many periods and two players alternate in making
proposals. Let B  f(x1; x2) 2 R2 : x1 + x2  1g be the non-empty, closed, and strictly
comprehensive set of possible agreements in terms of average present values to the two
players. The Pareto frontier of B is referred to as the bargaining frontier. For convenience, let
i : R! R be the continuous and strictly decreasing function that describes the bargaining
frontier; (x1; x2) 2 B is on the bargaining frontier if and only if xi = i(xj) for i; j = 1; 2,
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and i 6= j. The disagreement game is given in normal form: G = hA1; A2; d1 () ; d2 ()i,
where Ai is the set of player is disagreement actions that is assumed to be non-empty and
compact, and di () : A! R is player is disagreement payo¤ function that is assumed to be
continuous, where A = A1A2 is the set of disagreement outcomes. We assume that G has
at least one Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality, every players minimax value in
G is normalized to 0. Lastly, assume that every disagreement outcome is weakly dominated
by some agreement; d(a) 2 B for all a 2 A.
A generic outcome path, denoted by  =
 
a1; a2;    ; aT ; x for T  0, consists of all
disagreement outcomes (at 2 A in period t for t  T ) before the agreement x 2 B is reached
in period T + 1. Such an outcome path species an immediate agreement with T = 0,
and perpetual disagreement with T = 1. Player is intertemporal time preference on the
set of all possible outcome paths is represented by his average discounted payo¤s from the
disagreement game before the agreement and the agreement itself afterward:
v() = (1  i)
TX
t=1
t 1i di
 
at

+ Ti xi; (1)
where i 2 (0; 1) is player is discount factor per period.
The negotiation model described so-far is a well-dened noncooperative game of complete
information. A history is a complete description of how the game has been played up to
a period. A players strategy species one appropriate action for every nite history. For
technical convenience, we allow for publicly correlated strategies where players can coordinate
their continuation play based on public coordination devices. Every strategy prole induces
a unique distribution on outcome paths and players evaluate their strategies based on their
expected average discounted payo¤s. The equilibrium concept applied throughout this paper
is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Many important and inuential studies in the literature are special cases of this general
negotiation model. For example, one may interpret the models of Rubinstein (1982), Herrero
(1989), and van Damme (1991) having a degenerate disagreement game. Fernandez and
Glazer (1991) study the case of a specic common interest disagreement game and a linear
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bargaining frontier, while Haller (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) further impose a
common discount factor. With a general disagreement game and a common discount factor,
Busch and Wen (1995, 2001) analyze the case with a linear bargaining frontier, while Houba
(1997) generalizes the analysis to a concave and piecewise-linear bargaining frontier. More
recently, Slantchev (2003) studies this model with a general common interest disagreement
game and a linear bargaining frontier. One important message from these studies is that this
negotiation model generally admits multiple SPEs, including ine¢ cient delay despite of the
fact that the players are completely informed. What is less clear is a full characterization
of the set of SPE payo¤s. More importantly, we must reexamine the backward induction
method used in nding the extreme SPE payo¤s in this model, in particular, when the two
players have di¤erent time preferences.
3 The Set of SPE Payo¤s
Given a Nash equilibrium in the disagreement game, the negotiation model has a stationary
SPE that species the Nash equilibrium in every disagreement game. Standard arguments
apply to the establish existence of such a stationary SPE, which we omit. The existence of a
Nash equilibrium in the disagreement game ensures that set of SPE payo¤s in the negotiation
model is non-empty. The key to characterize the set of SPE payo¤s is then to derive each
players lowest and highest SPE payo¤s, referred to as extreme SPE payo¤s. We rst provide
a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for these extreme SPE payo¤s in Section 3.1. In
applying these conditions to derive the extreme SPE payo¤s in one period, we need to know
the Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s in the following period. We then focus on these e¤ective
continuation payo¤s in Section 3.2. It turns out that the Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s
depends on both the discount factors and the extreme SPE payo¤s. As shown in Section
3.3, this inter-dependency between the extreme SPE payo¤s and the Pareto frontier of SPE
payo¤s requires a new set of techniques to analyze the negotiation model with di¤erent time
preferences. Our analysis is su¢ cient to characterize the extreme SPE payo¤s, and hence
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the set of SPE payo¤s in any negotiation game. Finally, we will tie our results to the existing
literature on the negotiation model in Section 3.4.
3.1 Extreme SPE Payo¤s
Let Ei, for i = 1 and 2, be the non-empty set of SPE payo¤s in any period in which player i
makes a proposal to player j for j 6= i. For simplicity, we suppress all the other parameters
that Ei may depend on, such as the discount factors. Given the model setup, Ei is a bounded
subset of R2+. Applying the technique of self-generating payo¤s for a repeated game by Abreu
et al. (1986, 1990), and for a bargaining game by Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Binmore
(1987),3 we can prove that Ei is also compact and convex.4 Given the compactness of Ei,
for l = i and j, player ls lowest and highest SPE payo¤s when player i proposes are
mil = min
v2Ei
vl and M il = max
v2Ei
vl: (2)
In any period in which player i proposes, after player j rejects player is proposal, the
players have to play a disagreement outcome a 2 A in the current period and a continuation
SPE with payo¤ vector v = (vi; vj) 2 Ej in the following period when player j proposes.
Playing a 2 A in the current period and v 2 Ej in the following period is a SPE if and only
if, for l = i and j,
(1  l)dl(a) + lvl  (1  l)gl(a) + lmjl , (3)
where gl(a) = maxa0l2Al dl(a
0
l; a l). Inequality (3) states that player ls payo¤ from complying
is at least what he could obtain by deviating from a 2 A in the current period followed by
his lowest SPE in the following period. Obviously, any Nash equilibrium of G satises (3)
for all discount factors and all continuation payo¤s. By incorporating the possibility of
unacceptable proposals explicitly in the backward induction technique of Shaked and Sutton
(1984), we obtain the following result:
3See e.g., Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and van Damme (1991) for more comprehensive treatments of
self-generating sets of SPE payo¤s.
4Upon request, a detailed proof is available from the authors.
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Proposition 1 For all (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, we have
mii = min
a2A;v2Ej
max

(1  i)di(a) + ivi;
i ((1  j) dj(a) + jvj) ; s.t. (3), (4)
M ii = max
a2A;v2Ej
max

(1  i)di(a) + ivi;
i ((1  j) dj(a) + jvj) ; s.t. (3), (5)
mij = min
a2A;v2Ej
(1  j)dj(a) + jvj; s.t. (3), (6)
M ij = max
a2A;v2Ej
(1  j)dj(a) + jvj; s.t. (3). (7)
Proof. In any period in which player i proposes, player j may either accept or reject
player is proposal. A strategy prole also requires how the game will be played after player j
rejects every possible proposal by player i, which generally depends on the rejected proposal.
More specically, a SPE must specify a proposal x^ = (x^i; x^j) 2 B by player i, and for all
x 2 B, player js response to x and a continuation SPE that consists of a(x) 2 A and
v(x) 2 Ej after player j rejects x. Denote player is payo¤ from such a general SPE as
vi =

(1  i)di(a(x^)) + ivi(x^); if player j rejects x^;
x^i; if player j accepts x^:
(8)
First, consider any sequence of proposals fxng1n=1  B such that xni = i
 
xnj

> vi for all
n  1 and limn!1 xni = vi . For vi to be player is SPE payo¤, player j must reject xn and
player i must receive no more than vi after player j rejects x
n for all n  1 (otherwise, player
i would have an incentive to propose xn instead). In other words, for all n  1, we have
(1  i)di(a(xn)) + ivi(xn)  vi and xnj  (1  j)dj(a(xn)) + jvj(xn). (9)
Since A is compact by assumption, sequence fa(xn)g1n=1  A has a convergent subsequence,
say (without loss of generality) limn!1 a(xn) = a 2 A. The compactness of Ej then implies
that fv(xn)g1n=1  Ej also has a convergent subsequence, say (without loss of generality)
limn!1 v(xn) = v. Since (a(xn); v(xn)) satises (3) for all n  1, so does (a; v) due to the
continuity of d(). As n!1, the two inequalities in (9) become
(1  i)di(a) + ivi  vi and xj  (1  j)dj(a) + jvj.
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Note that i
 
xj

= vi due to the continuity of 
i () and xni = i
 
xnj

> vi for all n  1.
By the monotonicity of i (), we obtain
vi  max

(1  i)di(a) + ivi; i ((1  j) dj (a) + jvj)
	
;
which is bounded from below by the right-hand side of (4). Let (a^; v^) be a solution to the
optimization problem (4). Consider the following strategy prole ^:
 player i proposes x^ where x^i = max

(1  i)di(a^) + iv^i;
i (1  (1  j)dj(a^)  j v^j) ;
 player j accepts x if and only if xj  (1  j)dj(a^) + j v^j; and
 the continuation SPE is (a(x); v(x)) = (a^; v^) after player j rejects x for all x 2 B:
Strategy prole ^ constitutes a SPE, from which player i receives exactly (4). Hence, (4)
characterizes player is lowest SPE payo¤mii.
Second, accepting x^ is a best response for player j if and only if x^j  (1  j)dj(a(x^)) +
jvj(x^). Together with (8), we have
vi 

(1  i)di(a(x^)) + ivi(x^); if player j rejects x^;
i ((1  j)dj(a(x^)) + jvj(x^)) ; if player j accepts x^;
which is bounded from above by the right-hand side of (5). The strategy prole ^ above
with (a^; v^) being a solution to the optimization problem in (5) supports player is highest
SPE payo¤M ii .
Third, player j certainly rejects any x 2 B such that xj is less than the right-hand side
of (6), because player i cannot receive less than his lowest continuation payo¤ after rejecting
any proposal. Therefore, player js SPE payo¤s are bounded from below by the right-hand
side of (6). Furthermore, player j receives exactly the right-hand side of (6) in the SPE ^
above with (a^; v^) being a solution to the optimization problem in (6).
Lastly, since player j certainly accepts any x 2 B such that xj is greater than the right-
hand side of (7), player i will never propose x 2 B such that xj is more than player js highest
continuation payo¤. In other words, x^j must be less than or equal to the right-hand side of
8
(7). Whether player j accepts x^ or not, player j cannot obtain more than the right-hand
side of (7). Again, player j receives exactly the right-hand side of (7) in the SPE ^ above
with (a^; v^) being a solution to the optimization problem in (7).
Note that (4) and (5) are signicantly di¤erent from what we know from the current
literature. The rst component in these two bounds represents what the proposing player
receives from making an unacceptable proposal. The possibility of making unacceptable
proposals has often been overlooked, which could a¤ect nal conclusions as we have seen in
the current literature. Proposition 1 revises what has been commonly used by including the
possibility of making unacceptable proposals into the analysis.
Although the objective functions in (4) (7) are well-dened and continuous, A is com-
pact, we know nothing about Ej at this stage other than its non-emptiness, compactness,
and convexity. In order to fully understand the issues involved, we have to discuss e¤ective
continuation SPE payo¤s in solving these extreme SPE payo¤s. We next show that the
most e¤ective continuation SPE payo¤s in solving (4) (7) are those that are on the Pareto
frontier of Ej. Accordingly, denote the Pareto frontier of Ej as
'j(vi) = max
v02Ej
v0j s.t. v
0
i  vi and 'i(vj) = max
v02Ej
v0i s.t. v
0
j  vj: (10)
Since Ej is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of R2+, both 'i() and 'j() are contin-
uous and non-increasing. Given Proposition 1, the following conditions on the responding
player js extreme SPE payo¤s are immediate:
Proposition 2 For all (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, we have
mij  jmjj; (11)
M ij  max
a2A

(1  j)dj(a) + j'j

1  i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)] + imii

: (12)
Proof. Substituting (3) into (6), we have
mij  min
a2A

(1  j)gi(a) + jmjj

= (1  j)min
a2A
max
a0i
di(a
0
i; aj) + jm
j
j;
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which is (11) since player js minimax value in G is normalized to be zero. For l = j, (3)
and (10) imply that
vj  'j(vi)  'j

1  i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)] +mji

: (13)
Substituting (13) into (7), we obtain (12).
For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, Proposition 2 implicitly describes how the players
behave in the responding players worst and best SPEs. In player js worst SPE, if player j
rejects any proposal, he will receive his minimax value of 0 when playing G in the current
period followed by his lowest SPE payo¤mjj in the following period. In player js best SPE,
on the other hand, if player j rejects any proposal, he will receive his highest continuation
payo¤, taking into account that player i must be compensated in the following period after
complying in the disagreement game. In fact, when the players are su¢ ciently patient, (11)
and (12) hold with equalities for the responding players lowest and highest SPE payo¤s.
These results generalize those of Busch and Wen (1995).
We now turn to the proposing players extreme SPE payo¤s.
Proposition 3 For all (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, we have
mii  min
a2A
max
(
(1  i)gi(a) + 2imii;
i

(1  j)dj(a) + j'j

1 i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)] + imii

;
(14)
M ii  max
(
maxa2A
h
(1  i)di(a) + i'i

1 j
j
[gi(a)  dj(a)] +mjj
i
;
i(jm
j
j):
(15)
Proof. Substituting (3) and (13) into (4) yields
mii  min
a2A
max
(
(1  i)gi(a) + imji ;
i

(1  j)dj(a) + j'j

1 i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)] +mji

;
which implies (14) due to mji  imii by Proposition 2. For l = i, (3) and (10) imply that
vi  'i (vj)  'i

1  j
j
[gj(a)  dj(a)] +mjj

:
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Substituting the last inequality and (3) into (7) yields
M ii  max
(
maxa2A
h
(1  i)di(a) + i'i

1 j
j
[gj(a)  dj(a)] +mjj
i
;
maxa2A 
i
 
(1  j)gj(a) + jmjj

;
which is equivalent to (15) due to the monotonicity of i() and the normalization of player
js minimax value in G.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that proposing players lowest SPE is essential to determine
the other extreme SPE payo¤s. In order to solve mii from (14), we need to know the Pareto
frontier of Ej, which contains the e¤ective continuation payo¤s.
3.2 E¤ective Continuation Payo¤s
First, we discuss how Ej is determined by the playerslowest SPE payo¤s. Whenever player
j proposes,  =
 
a1; a2;    ; aT ; x can be supported as a SPE outcome path if and only if
for all t  T + 1,
(1  l)
TX
s=t
s tl dl(a
s) + T+1 tl xl 

mil; if t is even,
mjl ; if t is odd,
for l = i and j; (16)
and for all t  T ,
(1  l)
TX
s=t
s tl dl(a
s) + T+1 tl xl  (1  l)gl(at) +

lm
j
l ; if t is even,
lm
i
l; if t is odd.
(17)
For t = T +1, (16) implies that no matter who proposes the nal agreement x 2 B, it needs
to be a SPE agreement in period T + 1. Condition (17) states that if player l deviates from
at in period t  T , then this player will be punished by his lowest SPE payo¤, either mil
or mjl , in the following period. With publicly correlated strategies, E
j is the convex hull
of fv() : (16) and (17)g, where v() is dened in (1). Note that for T = 0, (16) and (17)
imply that for any xi 2

mji ; 
i(mjj)

immediate agreement on
 
xi; 
j (xi)

belongs to Ej.5
Hence, 'j(vi)  j(vi) for all (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2 and vi 2

mji ; 
i(mjj)

.
Due to Proposition 2, when the discount factors are su¢ ciently large, we can rewrite
(16) and (17) in terms of mii and m
j
j only. Consequently, the set E
j depends on mii and
5This generalizes the range of SPE payo¤s with immediate agreement in Haller and Holden (1990).
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mjj only. For i = 1 and 2, substituting E
j (j 6= i) in terms of mii and mjj into (4) provides
two equations, one for m11 and one for m
2
2. The solution m
i
i from such an implicit equation
system can be supported as player is (lowest) SPE payo¤ for i = 1 and 2 when the discount
factors are su¢ ciently large.
In Proposition 3, we show that only the Pareto frontier of Ej is e¤ective in solvingmii from
(14). In the rest of this subsection, we provide specic structures on the continuation paths
that achieve the Pareto frontier of Ej, which requires the insights in Lehrer and Pauzner
(1999) derived for repeated game with di¤erent time preferences. The key issue is that
there may be many SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model that can be above the bargaining
frontier. Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) investigate in great detail the Pareto frontier of SPE
payo¤s in a repeated game under di¤erent time preferences. There are many obstacles in
directly applying their results to a negotiation game. SPE payo¤s in a repeated game are
bounded from below by playersstage-game minimax payo¤s that are invariant with respect
to the discount factors and time periods. In a negotiation game, however, playerslowest
SPE payo¤s depend on the discount factors and also on who proposes. A typical outcome
path in a negotiation game ends with an agreement that ceases any future payo¤ variation.
In a repeated game, it may not be possible to have a SPE in which a player receives exactly
his minimax payo¤, so it is often su¢ cient to provide a SPE where a players payo¤ is
su¢ ciently close to his minimax value. In a negotiation game, however, we need the SPE
where a player receives exactly his lowest SPE payo¤. In order to derive the Pareto frontier
of Ej, we have to modify Lehrer and Pauzners technique for these di¤erences between a
repeated game and a negotiation game.
According to Lehrer and Pauzner (1999), in order to characterize the Pareto frontier of
Ej in the direction of  = (i; j) 2 , where   R2+ denotes the unit simplex, we need to
solve the following optimization problem:
max

  v(), subject to (16) and (17). (18)
In other words, (18) provides the payo¤ vectors on the Pareto frontier Ej in the direction of
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Figure 1: The curve of payo¤ vectors v for all  2 .
 2 . When G is a nite game, Ej is a polygon in R2+ and (18) provides us all the vertices
in the direction of  2 . Note that under (16) and (17), we can write (18) as
max
T0
TX
t=1
max
yt

i(1  i)t 1i yti + j(1  j)t 1j ytj

;
where yt = d(at) 2 d(A) for all t  T and yT = x 2 B \ Ej at t = T + 1. In the rest of this
subsection, we will solely focus on i < j, while similar arguments apply for i > j.
When i < j, for all  = (i; j) 2 , the weight ratio
j(1  j)t 1j
i(1  i)t 1i
is monotonically increasing with respect to t  0. Therefore, in any potential solution to
(18) with T > 0, we must have
di(a
t)  di(at+1) > xi and dj(at)  dj
 
at+1

< xj = 
j (xi) ; (19)
whenever it is possible under (16) and (17). Given i < j, the weight ratio will be greater
than one for su¢ ciently large t. This implies that the two players must reach an agreement
within nite periods in any potential solution to (18). These arguments narrow down the
potential solutions to (18). Given (19), sequential rationality (16) simplies to xi  mii if
T is even, and xi  mji if T is odd. For all t  T , d(at) should be as close as possible to
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Figure 2: The Pareto frontier of Ej where ~x = (i(mjj);m
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j).
the Pareto frontier of d(A), provided that (16) and (17) hold. As in a repeated game, player
js per-period payo¤ during the early phase of such an outcome path could be lower than
his minimax value. Since player js payo¤ increases over time, his average payo¤ from the
entire path will not be less than his lowest SPE payo¤. Let v, for all  2 , denote the
payo¤ vector resulting from a solution to (18) under (19). Figure 1 illustrates the curve of
payo¤ vectors v for all  2  under a linear bargaining frontier. Similar as in Lehrer and
Pauzner (1999), this curve is continuous in all d (at) and the nal agreement that is either
(mii; 
j(mii)) or (im
i
i; 
j(im
i
i)).
Figure 1 does not fully specify the Pareto frontier ofEj, because the outcome path  = (~x)
with an immediate agreement on ~xj = m
j
j and ~xi = 
i(mjj) (with T = 0) may also solve
(18), in particular when j=i is su¢ ciently close to 0. With publicly correlated strategies,
the Pareto frontier of Ej is completely characterized by ~x and v for all  2 . Figure 2
illustrates the two possible cases. Given mjj, E
j (as a correspondence of mii) is convex-valued
and continuous with respect to mii. Moreover, the function '
j, which is implicitly a function
of mii and m
j
j, is also continuous in both m
i
i and m
j
j.
To summarize, whenever time preferences are su¢ ciently di¤erent, the Pareto frontier of
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Ej is generally above the bargaining frontier.6 This will a¤ect how mii is determined. As
we have shown above, the Pareto frontier of Ej is rather complicated, which prevents us
from obtaining a closed-form solution for mii. Nevertheless, our analysis provides a general
technique on how to solve the playerslowest SPE payo¤s, and, hence, how to characterize
the set of SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model when i 6= j. In the next section, we will
demonstrate how this technique works for a common interest disagreement game and a linear
bargaining frontier.
3.3 Proposing Players Lowest SPE Payo¤
In the previous subsections, we have established that mii and m
j
j are the key in nding the
other extreme SPE payo¤s. Note that condition (14) depends on mii directly and on m
i
i and
mjj indirectly. In this subsection, we will show how to solve m
i
i as the least xed-point to
(14) and provide an important range for its value. Figure 2 suggests that we need to analyze
two distinct cases.
Case 1: i < j
Instead of solving mii and m
j
j simultaneously from the implicit equation system implied
by (14), we can rst nd mii independently of m
j
j when i and j are su¢ ciently large.
Condition (14) can be rewritten as mii  (mii), where
(mii) = min
a2A
max
(
(1  i)gi(a) + 2imii;
i

(1  j)dj(a) + j'j

im
i
i +
1 i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)]

:
(20)
Since 'j

im
i
i +
1 i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)]

is continuous with respect to a 2 A,mii and (indirectly)
mjj, (20) is a well-dened and continuous function of m
i
i. To solve (20) when i is su¢ ciently
close to 1, we only need to know 'j (vi) for vi su¢ ciently close to imii, i.e.,
vi 2

im
i
i; im
i
i +
1  i
i
max
a2A
[gi(a)  di(a)]

:
6Similar as in Lehrer and Pauzner (1999), for every i < 1 and j approximately equal to 1, we have that
v is almost rectangular in Figure 1.
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As we have shown in Section 3.2 for the case of i < j, 'j() in this part of its domain is
independent of mjj for su¢ ciently large (i; j).
7
In order to present our next main proposition, we need additional notation. For every
a 2 A, dene
F (xi; a) = 
i

(1  j)dj(a) + jj

ixi +
1  i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)]

; (21)
which is a monotonic increasing and continuous function of xi. Given a 2 A, F (xi; a) has,
at least, a xed-point over the following interval:
[xi(a); xi(a)] 

min

i(dj(a));
gi(a)  di(a)
i

;max

i(dj(a));
gi(a)  di(a)
i

:
Because both i() and j() are monotonically decreasing functions, we have
F (xi(a); a)  i
 
(1  j)dj(a) + jj (xi(a))
  i (dj(a))  xi(a);
F (xi(a); a)  i
 
(1  j)dj(a) + jj (xi(a))
  i (dj(a))  xi(a):
The last two inequalities and the monotonicity of function F (; a) imply that F (; a) maps
from [xi(a); xi(a)] into itself. By Brouwers xed point theorem, F (; a) has a least xed-
point in [xi(a); xi(a)]. In many cases, such as when the bargaining frontier is linear, F (; a)
has a unique xed-point for all a 2 A. However, this may not the case in general. Let
Xi(a) = fxi 2 [xi(a); xi(a)] : F (xi; a) = xig denote the set of all xed-points of (21). Since
F (; a) is continuous, Xi(a) is a closed subset of a compact interval, hence it is compact.
Now dene
m^ii = min
a2A
max

gi(a)
1+i
; min
xi2Xi(a)
xi

: (22)
Our next proposition identies the least xed-point of  () in the rened interval of [0; m^ii]
as a lower bound on mii.
Proposition 4 For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2 and i < j, mii is bounded from below
by the least xed-point of () in [0; m^ii].
7In fact, this part of 'j() is the curve of vectors v in Figure 1, which is independent of mjj .
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Proof. Since both i () and 'j () are continuous and monotonically decreasing, () is
a well-dened, continuous and monotonically increasing function of mii. First, observe from
(20) that (0)  mina2A [(1  i)gi(a)] = 0. Since j (vi)  j (vi) for all vi 2 [0; i (0)], (20)
implies that
(mii)  min
a2A
max

(1  i)gi(a) + 2imii;
F (mii; a):
(23)
Let a^ 2 A be a solution to (22) and x^i(a^) = minxi2Xi(a^) xi. There are two possibilities:
either m^ii =
gi(a^)
1+i
 F (x^i(a^); a^) = x^i(a^) or m^ii = F (m^ii; a^)  gi(a^)1+i :
Evaluate (23) at m^ii, we have
(m^ii)  max

(1  i)gi(a^) + 2i m^ii
F (m^ii; a^)
 m^ii:
To summarize, we have shown that (0)  0 and (m^ii)  m^ii. Due to its monotonicity, ()
must map from [0; m^ii] into itself. Brouwers xed point theorem then asserts that () has
at least one xed-point in [0; m^ii]. Since any value m
i
i that is less than the least xed point
of () violates mii  (mii), mii must be bounded from below by the least xed-point of ()
in [0; m^ii].
Our next proposition asserts that when the discount factors are su¢ ciently close to 1, the
least xed-point of () can be supported as a SPE payo¤ of player i. Therefore, proposing
player is lowest SPE payo¤mii indeed coincides with the least xed-point of (). Since the
proof is rather long, we defer it to the Appendix.
Proposition 5 There exists a ^ 2 (0; 1) such that for all j > i  ^, there is a SPE in
which player i receives the least xed-point of ().
Case 2: i > j
First, we solve mjj independently as we described in Case 1 by switching i and j. Once
the value of mjj is given, '
j

im
i
i +
1 i
i
[gi(a)  di(a)]

is a continuous function of a 2 A
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and mii only. This allows us to establish similar results for m
i
i as in Proposition 4 and 5
for this case, which we omit. The proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 do not rely on the fact
that i < j, except by requiring that mii be the only unknown variable in the part of '
j()
we need. Similar to the case of i < j, mii is the least xed-point of (20) for large enough
(i; j) 2 (0; 1)2. This ends our discussion on Case 2.
3.4 Discussion and Related Literature
We have provided a complete procedure for deriving the proposing players lowest SPE payo¤
for su¢ ciently large discount factors. We are then able to characterize all other extreme SPE
payo¤s and, hence the set of SPE payo¤s in the negotiation model when the discount factors
are su¢ ciently large. The Pareto frontier of SPE payo¤s is rather complicated under di¤erent
time preferences, which makes it impossible to obtain a closed-form solution to the proposing
players lowest SPE payo¤. Although our discussions in the rest of this section refer to Case
1 in Section 3.3, they apply to both cases.
Proposition 4 provides an upper bound on the proposing players lowest SPE payo¤,
namely m^ii given by (22). The value of m^
i
i is directly related to studies on this issue in
the existing literature. It combines and balances two sets of reasonings that have been
identied. The rst term in (22) closely resembles player is no-concession payo¤ in Bolt
(1995), resulted from receiving alternately gi(a) (from making unacceptable proposals) and
0 (from being minimaxed after rejecting any proposal). The second term in (22) extends to
what has been identied by Busch and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997) for two subclasses of
the current model where both players always make acceptable proposals in player is worst
SPE.
There are situations where m^ii is in fact player is lowest SPE payo¤. When the frontier
of SPE payo¤s is a subset of the bargaining frontier, such as when the two players have a
common discount factor and B is convex, it can be veried that m^ii is the least xed point
of (). This result generalizes Haller (1991), Haller and Holden (1990), Busch and Wen
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(1995) and Houba (1997) to an arbitrary convex set B. Note however that common time
preferences alone are not su¢ cient to warrant this conclusion, we also need B to be convex.
We can take this insight one step further. In player is worst SPE, if we never need
any SPE whose payo¤ vector is above the bargaining frontier, m^ii will be player is lowest
SPE payo¤. Suppose that a^ 2 A is a solution to (20) at the least xed point of () and
gi(a^) = di(a^). Then the only e¤ective continuation payo¤ in solving (20) is 'j(imii), which
is always equal to j(imii) when i  j. When i > j, it is also likely the case that
'j(im
i
i) = 
j(im
i
i). Consequently, m^
i
i is the least xed point of (), and hence player is
lowest SPE payo¤. Although requiring gi(a^) = di(a^) might seem of limited interest, it is
trivial if player i has only one disagreement action, such as the rm in the wage bargaining
model analyzed by Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller (1991), Haller and Holden (1990)
and Bolt (1995).
In the case of a linear bargaining frontier j(xi) = 1   xi as in most of the current
literature, F (; a) is a contraction mapping, hence has a unique xed-point for all a 2 A.
Accordingly, (22) simplies to
m^ii = min
a2A
max

gi (a)
1 + i
;
1  j
1  ij

1  dj (a) + j
i
1  i
1  j [gi (a)  di (a)]

; (24)
where the second term is the expression identied by Muthoo (1999) when only acceptable
proposals are considered. Furthermore, when i = j = , together with the assumption
that d(a) 2 B for all a 2 A, mii = m^ii can be further simplied to what Busch and Wen
(1995) obtain, 1
1+
mina2A [1  di (a)  dj (a) + gi (a)]. Despite of the fact that m^ii is player
is lowest SPE payo¤ in all these instances we have discussed, player is lowest SPE payo¤ is
strictly less than m^ii in general, such as in the class of negotiation games we study in Section
4.
Our study strengthens the ndings by Rubinstein (1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991),
Herrero (1989), van Damme (1991), and many others in the standard alternating-o¤er bar-
gaining model, which can be considered as a special case of our model with a degenerate
disagreement game such that gi(a) = di(a) = 0 for all a 2 A. In this case, even if there are
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multiple SPEs, the frontier of SPE payo¤s must coincide with the bargaining frontier, and
hence mii = m^
i
i. Since 0  2ixi  xi < i
 
j
j (ixi)

for all x < mii, which is the least
xed-point of (), (20) reduces to
(mii) = max

2im
i
i; 
i
 
j
j
 
im
i
i
	
= i
 
j
j
 
im
i
i

:
This result theoretically underpins the commonly held wisdom for the standard alternating-
o¤er bargaining model; it is without loss of generality to assume that only acceptable pro-
posals support the extreme SPE payo¤s, which is also formally examined by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) in this simple case.
4 Common Interest Disagreement Games
In this section, we focus on an important class of negotiation games that contains the mod-
els studied in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller and Holden (1990), Bolt (1995), and
Slantchev (2003). The set of possible agreements is assumed to be B = f(x1; x2) 2 R2 :
x1 + x2  1g. The disagreement game is a common interest game where there exists a
unique Pareto dominant disagreement outcome.8 Formally, there is an a 2 A such that
d(a)  d(a) for all a 2 A. Without loss of too much generality, we assume that d(a) is on
the bargaining frontier, i.e., d1(a) + d2(a) = 1. Note that a 2 A is a Nash equilibrium in
G, and also a serious candidate to (24). In fact, the value of the objective function in (24)
at a 2 A,
xi(a
)  max

1
1 + i
di (a
) ;
1  j
1  ij [1  dj (a
)]

;
can be supported as a player is SPE payo¤ when the discount factors are su¢ ciently large.
The proof of the following proposition is similar to but much simpler than that of Proposition
5. It is straightforward to verify the following SPE. The strategy prole species a after
player is proposal is rejected and player is minimax outcome in G after player i rejects any
8Common interest games are studied in other dynamic settings, see, e.g., Farrel and Saloner (1985) and
Takahashi (2005).
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proposal. Player i demands xi(a) whenever player i proposes, and player j accepts player
is demand xi(a) if and only if i  j. Accordingly, we have
Proposition 6 For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, there is a SPE where player i receives
xi(a
) and player j receives no less than 1  xi(a) in a period when player i proposes.
With the linear bargaining frontier and the common interest disagreement game, most
results in Section 3 can be further rened. First, (7) implies that for all (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2,
M ij  (1  j)max
a2A
dj(a) + j max
v2Ej
vj = (1  j)dj(a) + jM jj : (25)
For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, (25) implies that in player js best SPE, if player
j rejects any proposal, player j will receive his highest disagreement payo¤ dj(a) in the
current period followed by his highest SPE payo¤ M jj in the following period. Our next
proposition characterizes the proposing players highest SPE payo¤.
Proposition 7 For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, we have
M ii  1 mij: (26)
Proof. In this class of negotiation games, (5) becomes
M ii = max

maxa;v [(1  i)di(a) + ivi] ; s.t. (3),
maxa;v [1  (1  j)dj(a)  jvj] ; s.t. (3),
 max

(1  i)maxa2A di(a) + imaxv2Ej vi;
1 mina;v [(1  j)dj(a)  jvj] ; s.t. (3),
 max(1  i)di(a) + iM ji ; 1 mij	 :
For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, however, it cannot be the case that
1 mij  (1  i)di(a) + iM ji :
Suppose not, thenM ii  (1 i)di(a)+iM ji and (25) would imply thatM ii  di(a), which
contradicts the fact that M ii  1   xj(a) > di(a) by Proposition 6. Consequently, (26)
must prevail.
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Proposition 7 implies that Case (b) in Figure 2 is impossible when the disagreement game
is a common interest game. (11), (25), and (26) provide three of the four conditions for the
extreme SPE payo¤s. With common interest disagreement games, these three conditions are
relatively simple because they are not a¤ected by the complications of the Pareto frontier of
SPE payo¤s. In this class of negotiation games, we are able to further rene Proposition 4:
Proposition 8 For su¢ ciently large (i; j) 2 (0; 1)2, we have
mii =
1  j
1  ij [1  dj (a
)]; if i  j;
mii 2

1  j
1  ij [1  dj (a
)];
1
1 + i
di (a
)

; if i < j:
Proof. Since dj(a)  dj(a) for all a 2 A and vj  M jj for all v 2 Ej, (26) and (11)
imply that M jj  1  imii. From (4), we have
mii  min
a2A;v2Ej
1  (1  j)dj(a)  jvj; s.t. (3),
 1  (1  j)dj(a)  jM jj
 1  (1  j)dj(a)  j(1  imii)
= (1  j) [1  dj(a)] + jimii;
) mii 
1  j
1  ij [1  dj (a
)] :
Together with Proposition 6, i.e., mii  xi(a), we conclude this proof.
When i  j, we pin down the value of mii at xi(a). Therefore, the SPE of Propositions
6 is indeed player is worst SPE when i  j. This conclusion conrms the ndings in the
literature if and only if the proposing player is at least as patient as the responding player.
When i < j, Proposition 8 connes the value of mii between the two bounds that have
been studied. Solvingmii from (14) requires the Pareto frontier of E
j, that must be generated
from the following type of paths:
T = (a; : : : ; a| {z }
T
; x); for all T  0; (27)
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Figure 3: The payo¤ vectors v(T ) for T  8:
where xi = m
j
i for even T and x

i = m
i
i for odd T . With Proposition 8, it is straightforward
to verify that for any even T  0,
vi(
T ) < vi(
T+1)  vi(T+2) < di(a); (28)
vj(
T ) > vj(
T+2) < vj(
T+1) < dj(a
): (29)
(28) and (29) can be best illustrated by Figure 3, where v(T ) is represented by solid dots
for even T  8 and open dots for odd T < 8. It implies that for any even T  0, v(T+1) is
dominated by some convex combination of v(T ) and v(T+2). Intuitively speaking, if the
continuation path were associated with an odd T , then player i would make a proposal along
such a continuation, from which player i could exploit his advantage of being the proposer.
Consequently, such a continuation can never be e¤ective in solving (4). For all even T , any
convex combination of v(T ) and v(T+2) can be achieved by a publicly correlated strategy
between T and T+2.
For su¢ ciently large i < j, when vi is su¢ ciently close to imii,
'j(vi) = min
T22N

vj(
T ) +
vj(
T+2)  vj(T )
vi(T+2)  vi(T )

vi   vi(T )

; (30)
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which is a concave, decreasing and piecewise-linear function of vi. Substituting (30) into
(20), one can solve the least xed point of mii = (m
i
i).
We now present an example to demonstrate how to solve mii when i < j. Consider a
negotiation game with the following 2 2 disagreement game for "  0:
Player 1 n Player 2 L R
U 0:5; 0:5  "; 0:5
D 0:5; 0 0;  1
where a = (U;L). For simplicity, we consider pure actions only. Note that in this example,
(22) yields
m^11 = min

1
1 + 1
1
2
;
1  2
1  12

1
2
+
2
1
1  1
1  2 "

:
Contrary to what the current literature suggests, m^11 is not player 1s lowest SPE payo¤ in
this example when 2 is signicantly higher than 1. Finding m11 in this example is still a
daunting task. First, we need to solve the least xed-point of () for each linear segment
of '2() as in the rst linear segment demonstrated below. Then, we need to identify the
minimum of these xed-points for all linear segments of '2().
We now demonstrate a SPE where the continuation payo¤s are on the rst linear segment
of the Pareto frontier '2(), i.e., continuations involve at most two periods of delay in reaching
an agreement. Consider the following strategy prole:
 In an odd period, player 1 demands
x1 =
1  2
1  12

1
2
+
2
1
1 + 2
1 + 1
"

(31)
and player 2 will reject if and only if player 1 demands more than x1.
If player 1 demands more than x1 and player 2 rejects, then (U;R) will be played.
 In an even period, if player 1 deviates from U in the last (odd) period, player 2 will
o¤er 1x1 and player 1 will accept.
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 Otherwise, with probability 1   p, player 2 will o¤er 1x1 in the current even period,
and with probability p, (U;L) will be played for two periods, followed by player 2s
o¤er 1x1. Player 1 accepts in both cases. In this equilibrium,
p =
1
1(1  1) 
"
0:5  1x1
: (32)
 In an even period, if player 1 rejects 1x1 (that should be accepted), then (D;R) will
be played once followed by player 1s demand x1.
 If player 2 deviates from the strategies described above, then continuation will switch
immediately to the stationary SPE from which player 1 receives 0.5.
To verify that the above strategy prole constitutes a SPE, rst note that player 1 has
no incentive to deviate from (U;R) if his payo¤ from deviation is the same as what player 1
receives if he does not:
21x

1 = (1  1)  ( ") + 1

(1  p)1x1 + p
 
0:5(1  21) + 31x1

: (33)
One can show that (33) holds for p as given by (32). Next, player 1 should demand x1 rather
than making an unacceptable proposal,
x1  (1  1)  ( ") + 1

(1  p)1x1 + p
 
0:5(1  21) + 31x1

= 21x

1;
which follows from (33). Lastly, player 1 cannot demand more than x1 since 1 x1 is exactly
equal to player 2s continuation payo¤ after rejecting any demand higher than x1:
1  x1 = 0:5(1  2) + 2[(1  p)(1  1x1) + p

0:5(1  22) + 22(1  1x1)

]: (34)
In fact, (33) and (34) yield x1 and p as given by (31) and (32), respectively.
For 1 = 0:8 and " = 0:15, Figure 4 shows x1 < m^
1
1 for all 2 2 (0:877; 1). When the di¤er-
ence between the playerstime preferences is not signicant enough such as 2 2 (0:8; 0:877),
it would be too costly to compensate player 1 during the delay in the continuation. When
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Figure 4: Plot of x1 with respect to 2 2 (1; 1) for 1 = 0:8 and " = 0:15.
this happens, the SPE of Proposition 6 is likely to be player 1s worst SPE. However, such
incidence diminishes as the value of " decreases.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
Without loss of generality, assume that when i  0 and j  0 for some 0 2 (0; 1),
there exists a SPE from which player js payo¤ is less than j (m^ii)   " for some " > 0,
i.e., mjj  j (m^ii)   ". Let mii be the least xed-point of (), which generally depends on
(i; j) 2 (0; 1)2. For su¢ ciently large 00 and j > i  00, we have 'j(vi) depends only on
mii for all vi 2
h
im
i
i; im
i
i +
1 i
i
maxa2A [gi(a)  di(a)]
i
and
'j

im
i
i +
1  i
i
max
a2A
[gi(a)  di(a)]

 mjj +
"
2
: (35)
From the denition of 'j(), (vi; 'j(vi)) is a SPE payo¤ vector for all
vi 2

im
i
i; im
i
i +
1  i
i
max
a2A
[gi(a)  di(a)]

as long as j > i  maxf0; 00g and mii can be supported as player is SPE payo¤. Choose
^  maxf0; 00g su¢ ciently large so that 1 ^
^
maxa2A [gj(a)  dj(a)]  "2 . In other words, if
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j  ^ then player j will not deviate in the disagreement game as long as player js average
loss in the continuation payo¤s is no less than "
2
.
For all j > i  ^, let mii be the least xed-point of () and ~a 2 A be the corresponding
solution to (20). We have the following two cases to examine:
Case 1: mii = (1  i)gi(~a) + 2imii:
Consider the following strategy prole: Player i makes an unacceptable o¤er (such as de-
mands mii or more). Player j rejects if and only if player i o¤ers less than
(1  j)dj(~a) + j'j

im
i
i +
1  i
i
[gi(~a)  di(~a)]

 j  mii ;
followed by ~a once. If player i deviates from ~a, player j will o¤er imii and player i will accept
in the following period. Otherwise, the continuation SPE in the following period will be on
the Pareto frontier of Ej from which player i will receive imii+
1 i
i
[gi(~a)  di(~a)]. If player
j deviates from what is described above, player j will be punished by the SPE provided at
the beginning of this proof from which his payo¤ will not be higher than j (m^ii)  ".
We now verify sequential rationality. It is clear from the construction that no one deviates
in the proposing and responding stages. For example, player i has to o¤er at least
(1  j)dj(~a) + j'j

im
i
i +
1  i
i
[gi(~a)  di(~a)]

in order to induce player j to accept, from which player i receives at most mii. Player i will
not deviate from ~a because
(1  i)gi(~a) + i
 
im
i
i

= (1  i)di(~a) + i

im
i
i +
1  i
i
[gi(~a)  di(~a)]

:
Case 2: mii = 
i

(1  j)dj(~a) + j'j

im
i
i +
1 i
i
[gi(~a)  di(~a)]

:
Consider the following strategy prole: Player i demands mii. Player j rejects if and only if
player i demands more than mii. If player i demands more and player j rejects (which should
not occur), the two players will play ~a, and the continuations are the same as those in Case
1 for the corresponding histories.
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Similar to Case 1, no one will deviate after player i demands more than mii and player j
rejects. If player i demands more than mii at the beginning, player j will reject, and player
i will receive
(1  i)di(~a) + i

im
i
i +
1  i
i
[gi(~a)  di(~a)]

 mii:
Therefore, player i will demand mii, which will be accepted by player j. In summary, no one
has an incentive to deviate when player i is supposed to demand mii.
We have shown that in either case, there is an equilibrium where player i receives mii,
the least xed-point of (), when making a proposal. 
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